OBJECTORS WITHOUT RECOURSE:
THE RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE AND MILITARY
DRAFT REGISTRATION
Michael I. Spak * and Steven R. Valentine**
I. INTRODUCTION

Under current federal law,' all American men must register for a
possible military draft when they reach the age of eighteen. 2 Since the
registration program began in July 1980, approximately 8,750,000
men have complied with its requirements, and an estimated 674,000
have failed or refused to do so. 3 On August 17, 1982, 4 twenty-year old
Enten Eller of Harrisburg, Virginia became the first person to be
convicted for a violation of the 1980 draft registration law.
Mr. Eller's defense was that he had refused to register for a
military draft because, as a practicing member of the Church of the
Brethren, he objects to all wars and to militarism in all forms. At his
' 5
trial, he testified that he was "obeying God.
There can be little doubt that Mr. Eller's situation is not unique.
His case, or another like it, may eventually come before the United
States Supreme Court. Any decision by the Court would turn on
constitutional grounds. The registration objector would argue that his
constitutional rights have been violated because current law affords
him no opportunity to assert, or to apply for, conscientious objector
status. At the present time, the United States Congress has not
mandated the initiation of a military draft. Mr. Eller, and others like
him, must register regardless of any well-founded and deeply-held
religious aversion to war and militarism.
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Is such a prospective constitutional argument a strong or a weak
one? Is it constitutional to require all young men of a certain age
group to register for a possible draft without affording the
conscientious objectors the opportunity to exercise their first
amendment rights in a tangible manner? Is there a reasonable way in
which to provide such men with a mechanism whereby they may
voice such beliefs without undermining the central purposes of the
registration law?
II.

THE HISTORY OF THE CURRENT DRAFT REGISTRATION LAW

Acting favorably on the recommendation of President Nixon,
Congress amended the Military Selective Service Act 6 [MSSA] to preclude conscription in 1973. 7 Draft registration continued, however,
until 1975 when President Ford discontinued it.8 As a result of his
alarm at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter decided
to ask Congress to reactivate draft registration. Although President
Carter sought the authority to require the registration of both young
men and young women, Congress agreed only to permit the registration of males."
The purpose of the new military draft registration law was to
facilitate any future conscription under the MSSA.' 0 Under the law,
the President is empowered to issue a proclamation whereby every
male citizen and male resident aliens between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-six may be required to register for the draft." President Carter
issued such an order, effective on July 2, 1980, to all males reaching
the age of eighteen.' 2 Inasmuch as the Act precludes conscription,
President Reagan, or any future president, will have to ask Congress
3
for additional authority in order to renew an actual military draft.'
At the time of President Carter's request for authority to renew
draft registration, congressional response was immediate. Speaking in
favor of the request, for example, Senator Warner told a Senate

'

Pub. L. No. 92-129, 85 Stat. 348 (1971) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 451-473 (West

1981 & Cum. Supp. 1982)).
1 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 467(c) (West 1981).
8 Proclamation No. 4360, 3A C.F.R. 33 (1976), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 453 at 15
(West 1981).
9 See generally Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 59-61 (1981) (providing background on
President Carter's request).
10 Id. at 59.
" 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 453 (West Cum. Supp. 1982).
11 Proclamation No. 4771, 3 C.F.R. 82 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 453 at 16
(West 1981). The proclamation applies to males born on or after January 1, 1960. Id.
11 See S. REP. No. 826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 154, 155 (1980).
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hearing on the plan that he " 'equate[d] registration with the
draft.' 14 In the United States Senate Armed Services Committee
Report on the Carter Administration's bill,1 5 it was reported that the
Army and the Navy had indicated that in the event of a military
mobilization, they would not have sufficient manpower to meet the
national emergency requirements. 1 6 In a specific finding that was
later adopted by both Houses of Congress, the report stated that "[If]
mobilization were to be ordered in a wartime scenario, the primary
manpower need would be for combat replacements."' 7
The provision of the 1980 draft registration act which required
men, but not women, to participate was subsequently challenged on8
constitutional grounds in the federal courts. In Rostker v. Goldberg,1
the United States Supreme Court determined that the disparity of
treatment between men and women under the Act was not unconstitutional. The Court held that it did not violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 9
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Rostker, observed
that the Constitution had given Congress the authority "To raise and
support Armies," "To provide and maintain a Navy," and "To make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces." 20 Whenever it is asked to determine the constitutionality of a
congressional act, Justice Rehnquist urged, the Supreme Court engages in what Justice Holmes called " 'the gravest and most delicate
duty that this Court is called upon to perform." 2' "The Court accords
'great weight to the decisions of Congress.' "22 Justice Rehnquist noted
that the current case arose in the area of national defense and military
23
affairs, an area over which Congress exercises great authority.
In the course of arguing that the Supreme Court was required to
defer to the authority of Congress to choose whom as between males
and females in the citizenry may be required to register for a military
draft, Justice Rehnquist noted that the Court had uniformly acknowl-

"

Dep't of Defense Authorization for Appropriationsfor Fiscal Year 1981: Hearings on S.
2294 Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1980) (statement of
Senator Warner), quoted in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 75 (1981).
'5 S. REP., supra note 13.
16 Id. at 154.
17 Id. at 160.
18 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
19 Id. at 72-74.
'0 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cls. 12-14.
21 453 U.S. at 64 (1981) (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927)).
22 453 U.S. at 64 (quoting Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 102 (1973)).
23 Id. at 64-65.
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edged congressional power "to raise and regulate armies and navies. '"24 This constitutional mandate therefore enabled Congress to
enact legislation that would achieve such a result. 25 He observed that
under the MSSA, registering for the draft would be the initial measure
" 'ina united and continuous process designed to raise an army speedily and efficiently.' "26 In 1980, Congress had provided for the reactivation of draft registration in order to, argued Justice Rehnquist,
"provid[e] the means for the early delivery of inductees in an emergency." 27 He therefore concluded that under the MSSA, "induction is
interlocked with registration: only those registered may be drafted,
and registration serves no purpose beyond providing a pool for the
draft."' 28 Congressional power to enact legislation requiring all men,
but not women, to register for the draft was thus upheld by the
Supreme Court.
Under the current draft registration law, all men who are encompassed by President Carter's proclamation, which President Reagan
has allowed to remain in force, must register for the draft. Conscientious objectors, and even ordained religious ministers or the theological students, are not exempted from the registration requirement of
MSSA. 29 If a draft were to be ordered by the President after Congress
had authorized him to do so, then presumably all potentially qualified
conscientious objectors could apply for such status through their respective draft boards.3 0 There is no manner, however, in which a
potential conscientious objector may assert his religiously-based antipathy to war and militarism as a part of the MSSA registration process,
save by violating the law in refusing to register.
III.

GENERAL STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS TO WAR

A. HistoricalPerspective
During the early part of American history, there was no legal
status for the conscientious objector to war. On occasions such as
24

Id. at 65.

2- Id. (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)); see Lichter v. United

States, 334 U.S. 742, 755-58 (1948).
26 453 U.S. at 75 (quoting Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 553 (1944)).
27 Id. (quoting S. REP., supra note 13, at 156).
11 453 U.S. at 75.
29 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 456(g)(1), (g)(2), (j) (West 1981). The MSSA does, however, exempt
members of the clergy from training and service, and defers liability for training and service for
qualified individuals. Id. § 456(g).
30 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 4560) (West 1981). This provision of the MSSA narrowly circumscribes consciencious objector status to include only those persons who "by reason of religious
training and belief, [are] conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." Id.
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Indian uprisings, the War for Independence, and the French and
Indian War, pacifists were required to pay a tax or to furnish a
substitute soldier, but only rarely were they forced to do either. 3 ' This
arrangement continued after the United States achieved independence. In the War of 1812, for example, anyone could be exempted
from military service by paying a special tax. 3 2 Some, though, refused
to pay it.
Until the Civil War, there was no federal military conscription
law in the United States. 33 When the first conscription bill was passed
in March 1863, no provision existed for exemption from the military
draft on religious grounds. 34 All men between the ages of twenty and
forty-five were declared liable for the draft, except a few who were
exempted on other grounds. 35 Any person who was drafted, however,
could furnish a substitute soldier, or pay for the location of a substitute. 36
Due in large part to the energetic lobbying of the peace
churches, 37 in February 1864 Congress amended the conscriptive law
to make provisions for conscientious objectors.3 8 All men who were
members of religious denominations that prohibited them from bearing arms would remain subject to the draft, but when drafted, were to
be considered non-combatants.3 These non-combatants were assigned by the Secretary of War to hospital duty, to the care of freed
slaves, or they were required to pay a sum of money to be applied
towards the care of sick and wounded soldiers. 40 When Northern
authorities found that neither the prescribed modes of alternative
service nor payment for a substitute was acceptable to a particular
religious pacifist, they typically "paroled" him for the duration of the
war. 41

No military conscription law was in effect in the United States
between the Civil War and World War 1.42 Under the Selective Draft

31

L.
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1757-1967, 18 (1968).
R. Beebe, The War of 1812, in R. Wells,

A

DOCUMENTARY
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OBJIECrION IN AMERICA,
32

THE WARS OF AMERICA: CHRISTIAN VIEWS

40

(1981).
supra note 31, at 18.
Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731 (1863).
35 Id. The exempted group included certain government officials, persons whose service in
the military would present an unusual hardship to their families, and convicted felons. Id.
36 Id. § 17, at 734.
37 L. SCHLISSEL, supra note 31, at 98.
3 Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, 13 Stat. 6, 9 (1864).
33 L. SCHLISSEL,

34

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

L. SCHLISSEL, supra note 31, at 89.

4

See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 171 (1965).
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Act of 1917, 4 however, conscription was virtually universal. 44 Although no provision was made for substitution or commutation fees,
conscientious objectors were recognized. 45 As had been the case in the
Civil War after 1864, such objectors were required to belong to a
recognized religious sect that forbade its members to bear arms. 46 Men
thus exempted from combat duty were required to do such alternative
service as the President should determine. 47 All men, regardless of
their eligibility for conscientious objector status, were required to
register for the draft48 and draft boards were organized to process
registrants .49
After World War I, the military draft was dormant until 1940,
when, at President Roosevelt's request, Congress enacted the Selective
Training and Service Act of 194 0.50 Under its provisions, all men
between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-six, except military academy cadets, diplomats, and non-citizens, were required to register. 51
Conscientious objectors were exempt from combat duty, 52 much as
they were during the Civil War and World War I, but on a somewhat
broader basis. To attain conscientious objector status from a local
draft board, a draftee did not have to be a member of an organized
religious group that proscribed bearing arms, but only had to be
"conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form" by
virtue of "religious- training and belief." 53 Conscientious objectors
were required to have their names listed on a register and were
54
required to do some form of alternative national service.
In 1947 President Truman recommended to Congress that it
allow the Selective Service Act to expire.,5 In June 1948, however,
Congress enacted the Military Selective Service Act. 5 6 The World War
II "by reason of religious training and belief" qualification for consci-

4 Pub. L. No. 65-12, 40 Stat. 76 (1917) (expiring four months after Proclamation of Peace by
President as provided by Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 29, § 4, 40 Stat. 217, 217).
44 Id. § 2, at 77-78.
45 Id. § 4, at 78.
46 Id.
47

Id.

41

Id. § 5, at 80.
Id. § 4, at 79.

49

50 Pub. L. No. 76-783, 54 Stat. 885 (1940) (expiring Mar. 31, 1947).
51 Id. § 2, at 885.
52 Id. § 5(g), at 889.
53

Id.

Id.
H. MAnRMION, SELECrIVE SERVICE: CONFLICTS AND CONSCIENCE 11 (1968). The President
recommended that the Act expire in March 1947. Id.
11 Pub. L. No. 80-759, 62 Stat. 604 (1948) (amended 1967).
54

11
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entious objector status was retained, but a definition was added. 57
The definition read: "Religious training and belief ...
means an
individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not
include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a
merely personal moral code." ' 58 All eligible men, regardless of status,
59
remained required to register for the draft.
The basic provisions of the MSSA regarding conscientious objectors remained unchanged through the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
B. Current Statutory Law
There are three subcategories of those who generally can be
called conscientious objectors under the draft exemptions of the
MSSA. 6 0 "Regular" or otherwise "duly ordained ministers of religion"
are exempt from "training and service but not from registration." 6'
An exemption also is provided for theological students. 62 Under the
principal conscientious objector provision, a man is not required to be
subject to combat training and service if, by reason of "religious
training and belief," he is "conscientiously opposed to participation in
war in any form."6 1 3 The "religious training and belief" requirement is
further refined to make explicit that it does not include "political,
'
sociological, philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code. 64
The MSSA further mandates that the local draft boards determine whether an individual draft registrant meets the definition of a
conscientious objector to war. If he qualifies, the draft board would
assign him to a non-combatant military service role.6 5 If the registrant
objects even to that limited association with the military, he may be
assigned to military service in the maintenance of "national health,
safety, or interest," as the Director of the Selective Service System
66
deems appropriate.
There is ample federal case law construing those provisions of the
MSSA that grant and define conscientious objector status.6 7 The SuId. § 6(j), at 612-13.
11 Id. at 613.
51 Id. § 3, at 605.
11 See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 456(g)(1), (g)(2), (j) (West 1981).
" 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 456(g)(1) (West 1981).
62 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 456(g)(2) (West 1981).
63 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 456(j) (West 1981).
17

64

Id.

65 Id.

66 Id.
67 See, e.g., McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 490 (1971) (conscientious objector claims
turn on factual question relating to nature of registrant's beliefs concerning war, religious basis
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preme Court, in McGee v. United States,68 held that conscientious
objector claims turn on a factual determination relating to the nature
of the registrant's beliefs concerning war, the basis for his objection
thereto in his conscience and religion, and the registrant's overall
sincerity. 9 In Parroltv. United States,7 0 a Ninth Circuit court held
that the ultimate issue in such situations is "the sincerity of the registrant in objecting, on religious grounds, to participation in war in any
form." 7' The draft boards and the courts, the court in Williams v.
United States72 held, are bound to carry out congressional determination that it is more essential to respect a man's religious beliefs than to
force him to serve in the armed services. 7 3 In yet another case,' 4 a
district court ruled that national policy favored allowing true consci75
entious objectors to avoid military service.
Other federal case law has established that it is possible for a
draft registrant to set forth a prima facie case for being granted
conscientious objector status.7 6 When the registrant clearly shows that
he is opposed to war in all forms, that this opposition is grounded in
religious training and belief (construed to include a moral, ethical,
and religious belief regarding right and wrong which is held with the
strength of traditional religious conviction), and that this objection is

for views, and his sincerity); Williams v. United States, 216 F.2d 350, 352 (5th Cir. 1954) (draft
boards and courts are bound to execute the congressionally mandated policy that it is more
essential to respect a man's religious beliefs than to compel military service); United States v. St.
Clair, 293 F. Supp. 337, 345 (E.D.NY. 1968) (registrant who is denied conscientious objector
status is entitled to be told why he does not qualify).
68 402 U.S. 479 (1971).
61 Id. at 491.
70 370 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1966).
11 Id. at 391-92 (emphasis added) (citing Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381 (1955)).
For cases holding that the ultimate question is the registrant's sincerity, see United States v.
Andrews, 446 F.2d 1086, 1088 (10th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Hemes v. McNulty, 432
F.2d 1182, 1186 (7th Cir. 1970); Kessler v. United States, 406 F.2d 151, 155 (5th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Warner, 284 F. Supp. 366, 369 (D. Ariz. 1968); United States v. Wymer, 284 F.
Supp. 100, 104 (S.D. Iowa 1968).
72 216 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1954).
71 Id. at 352.
74 Nurnberg v. Froehlke, 355 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 489
F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1973).
71 Id. at 1198.
76 See, e.g., Thompson v. United States, 474 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1973) (prima facie
conscientious objector status established by demonstration of sincere belief in a supreme being
who requires opposition to war); United States v. Davis, 460 F.2d 792, 796 (4th Cir. 1972)
(primaJacie case requires findings of two ultimate facts: that such objection is based on religious
training and belief; and that it encompasses any kind of war); United States v. Hanson, 460 F.2d
337, 340 (8th Cir. 1972) (prima facie case requires clear religious as opposed to "political,
sociological, or philosophical" opposition to war).
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a prima facie
sincere, the registrant is considered to have established
77
case for the conscientious objector classification.
Timing is an important factor in the consideration of whether
conscientious objector status should be granted. In a 1968 ruling, 78 a
United States District Court in Maine held that a draft registrant's
request for conscientious objector status must be made before his
actual induction into the Armed Forces. 79 In 1973, however, a federal
court of appeals80 refined this rule. Once a local draft board has
received a registrant's request for an application for conscientious
objector status, it must permit a sufficient and reasonable period of
time in which to file the form before the registrant is ordered to report
for military induction. 8'
C. ConstitutionalLaw
It is clear that the creation and retention of the conscientious
objector exemption from military service is solely the prerogative of
Congress. That is because a clear-cut constitutional right to conscientious objection has never been recognized. Nonetheless, constitutional
issues have risen in these cases.
The first amendment to the United States Constitution requires
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."18 2 This key constitutional clause applies to state and federal action by virtue of the
incorporation of its principles in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. 83 At stake in constitutional
cases involving the status of conscientious objectors, then, is the fundamental right to the free exercise of religion. That fundamental
right, however, must contend with the compelling national interest in
raising armies, an dnterest that Justice Rehnquist wrote so strongly
84
about in Rostker.
The closest the Supreme Court has come to denying that any
fundamental right to conscientious objection can withstand the fed-

" United States v. Auger, 337 F. Supp. 342, 346-47 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
v United States v. Blaisdell, 294 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Me. 1968).
71 Id. at 1305.
80 United States v. Salem, 479 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1973).

11 Id. at 341.
82 U.S. CONST. amend. I.

See L. TiUBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 813 (1978).
See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 70 (1981) (government interest in raising and supporting armies is
important and Congress should be afforded deference in exercising its constitutionally delegated
authority over military affairs); see supra text accompanying notes 24 & 25.
83
14
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eral Government's interest in raising armies was in Gillette v. United
States.85 In Gillette, the Court held that those whose religious convictions forbid them to take part in "unjust wars" but allowed them to
participate in other conflicts, may be denied the conscientious objector exemption from military conscription. 86 The Court reasoned that
the objector's right to the free exercise of religious beliefs was overridden by the Government's compelling "interest in procuring the manpower necessary for military purposes, pursuant to the constitutional
grant of power to Congress to raise and support armies. 8 7 Significantly, however, the Supreme Court, in dictum in the 1905 case of
Jacobson v. Massachisetts,88 recognized that the mesmerizing force
involved in overriding the national security interest is such that Congress need not grant exemption from mandatory military service to
any conscientious objectors.8 9
Constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe has suggested that,
under certain circumstances, the Supreme Court ought to affirm a
constitutional right to conscientious objection.9" "In light of the relative ease with which the conscientious objector exemption has been
administered throughout our history without placing a noticeable
burden on the country's military manpower needs," Tribe wrote, "a
court might well require a concrete showing of threat to such needs in
order to justify abolition of the exemption." 9 Professor Tribe points to
evidence that he says demonstrated that a constitutional right to
conscientious objection "was only mysteriously left out of the Bill of
92
Rights."
Despite Professor Tribe's historical argument, it is clear that the
Supreme Court has not recognized a constitutional right to conscientious objection in any form. 93 This places a formidable obstacle in the

-5 401 U.S. 437 (1971).

8 Id. at 439, 441.
8 Id. at 462.
197 U.S. 11 (1905).
8I Id. at 29, 30; cf. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(in complete consistency with the requirements of the Constitution, Congress could eliminate all
exemptions for conscientious objectors).
" L. TBE, supra note 83, at 856.
91 Id.

IId. at 856 n.54; see 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 749-51 (J. Gales ed. 1789); Gianella, Religious
Liberty, Non-establishment, and DoctrinalDevelopment: Part I, The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1412 n.89 (1967). Tribe wrote that the "Committee of the Whole
defeated an attempt to strike from the Bill of Rights a clause exempting religious conscientious
objectors from service. Inexplicably, the clause was not included in the Bill of Rights finally
approved." L. TRIBE, supra note 83, at 856 n.54.
" See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333,
356 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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path of religious objectors, like Enten Eller, 94 as they fight federal
convictions for evading military draft registration.
IV.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LIMITING THE CONSCIENTIOUS

OBJECTOR EXCEPTION TO THOSE WHO
REGISTER FOR THE

DAFT

A. The Bigman Case
The statutory and constitutional law discussed in the previous
section of this Article is premised on the act of registration for the
draft. One cannot become a conscientious objector in the eyes of the
law unless he first enters the Selective Service System as a registrant.
But what of the potential conscientious objector who sincerely believes
that even mere registration is far too great a compromise with a
system of militarism he finds abhorrent? One of the more recent
federal cases to decide this question in the face of a broadly based
constitutional attack on the distinction between registrants and nonregistrants was United States v. Bigman.9"
In Bigman, the defendant argued that the due process clause of
the fifth amendment was violated because the objector exemption was
limited to those persons who registered for the draft.9 6 Bigman further
argued that the registration procedure of the MSSA violated his "First
Amendment right to free exercise of his religious beliefs."'9 7 In its
decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
found authority for its decision that the discrimination between registrants and non-registrants was not " 'so unjustifiable as to be violative
of due process.' -9 The court pointed also to an unbroken line of
authority holding that the registration requirements of the Act do not
impermissibly impinge upon constitutionally protected freedom of
religion.99

"' See supra text accompanying note 4.
429 F.2d 13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 910 (1970).
9 429 F.2d at 14.
IId. at 14-15.
98 Id. at 15 (quoting Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)).
9 429 F.2d at 15; see United States v. Bertram, 477 F.2d 1329, 1330 (10th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Toussie, 410 F.2d 1156, 1161 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 397 U.S. 112
(1970); Richter v. United States, 181 F.2d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 1950); Michener v. United States,
184 F.2d 712, 714 (10th Cir. 1950); United States v. Henderson, 180 F.2d 711, 713 (7th Cir.
1950); Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38, 40 (6th Cir. 1949); Warren v. United States, 177 F.2d
596, 599 (10th Cir. 1949); cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 372 (1968) (provision that
applies to any person "who forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any
manner changes his registration certificate" held not unconstitutional); Garman v. United States
Postal Service, 509 F. Supp. 507, 509 (N.D. Ind. 1981) (requirement that United States Postal
15
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Also cited in the Bigman decision was the ruling in United States
v. O'Brien.100 At issue in O'Brien was the constitutionality of a federal
law that banned the purposeful destruction of military draft registration cards.' 0 ' In that case, the Court observed that "when 'speech' and
'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element may be used to justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms." 1 0 2 Characterizing the governmental interest
that is required in order to meet this burden, the Court noted:
[A] governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the government; if it furthers an important ... governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than
0 3
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.1
B. DistinguishingBigman
Upon initial consideration, it would appear that if the Bigman
precedent104 were applied directly in a situation similar to that in
Eller,0 5 then the likelihood that Mr. Eller, and others like him, could
gain reversals of their convictions on constitutional grounds is indeed
scant. Clearly, under Bigman, it is permissible for Congress to enact a
law making registration for the military draft a condition precedent to
the application for legal status as a conscientious objector. Mr. Eller's
case, however, may be distinguishable from that of Mr. Bigman in a
manner that would benefit him.
From 1948 until 1973, when Congress ended the draft by amending the MSSA to preclude conscription, 10 6 the law required both draft
registration and a system of military conscription. 0 7 This period, of
course, encompassed the year of the Bigman ruling. 08 Thus, even
though all potentially qualified conscientious objectors were required

Service personnel participate in registration of young men for the draft does not infringe or
curtail the religious freedom of those postal employees who object to such tangential participation in the military process).
1o 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
'01 Id. at 370.
101Id. at 376.
101Id. at 377.
104 See supra note 99.
105See N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1982, at A18, col. 1
10150 U.S.C.A. app. § 467(c) (West 1981).
107 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 451-501 (West 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
108 Bigman was decided in 1970.
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to register for the draft, they were all immediately eligible to attain
conscientious objector status by applying to their respective local draft
boards. 109 Each man who considered himself a conscientious objector,
therefore, was given a statutorily prescribed outlet by which he could
express his religious objection to war and militarism.
The resumption of draft registration in 1980110 marked the first
time since the end of World War II that registration, but not actual
conscription, has been required."' The requirement of registration
was mandated in case the President should determine that the national security of the United States requires a resumption of conscription." 2 Thus, all potentially qualified conscientious objectors are required to register for the draft, but are not eligible to attain
conscientious objector status by making application to local draft
boards. This is simply because there is no draft. Registrants such as
Mr. Eller, who consider themselves to be qualified conscientious objectors, therefore, have no legal recourse by which they can express
their objection to war and militarism.
Eller, then, can clearly be distinguished from Bigman. Mr.
Bigman had a means to register his objection to war by applying for
conscientious objector status under the draft law then in effect.1 1 3 Mr.
Eller has no such means by which to register his same objection; he
cannot apply for conscientious objector status. Given the nature of the
great deference to congressional authority in the area of raising armies
announced by Justice Rehnquist in Rostker,"4 it is highly unlikely that
the present Supreme Court would reverse Mr. Eller's conviction, or
one like his, on the ground that the MSSA as applied to him is
unconstitutional. Rather it is likely that the Court would follow the
rational in Rostker which found the disparate treatment of men and
women by Congress for purposes of draft registration to be constitutional. "5
V. PROPOSAL FOR A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION

Although there is no military conscription, the Selective Service
System presently provides no means of registering conscientious objec109See supra text accompanying note 65.
110 See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 453 (West 1981).
"I It should be noted that Congress ended the draft in 1973, but registration continued until
President Ford suspended it in 1975. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 467(c) (West 1981); Proclamation No.
4360, 3A C.F.R. 33 (1976), reprinted in, 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 453 at 15 (1981).
..
2 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 453 (West 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
.. See supra note 60.
"' See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
"15 See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
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tion to military service. How could such a means be furnished by the
law without harming the federal Government's well-recognized compelling interest in securing the draft registrations of those young men
whom Congress has required to register for the draft?
It is suggested that Congress amend the conscientious objector
status provision of the MSSA to read as follows:
During such times in which the President has ordered that certain
men must register for the military draft, but during which no
conscription has been authorized by this Act, the Director of the
Selective Service System shall provide that the following language
shall appear conspicuously on each draft registration form: "By
means of my completion of this draft registration form, I am
complying with my legal obligation to register for possible military
service. By placing my initials in the box provided for at left,
however, I state that if military conscription is commenced at such
time at which I am eligible for it, I intend to apply for conscientious objector status because I object, by virtue of my religious
training and belief, to all forms of war. I understand, though, that
if I choose not to place my initials in the box at left I will not be
waiving such right to apply for conscientious objector status."",
By providing such language in the MSSA, Congress would be recognizing the status of conscientious objectors, and would be giving those
people an opportunity to declare their position before conscription is
resumed. Additionally, it would thus afford Congress and the military
the opportunity to estimate with a reasonable degree of certainty, the
number of people who would apply for conscientious objector status
before any draft should occur.
VI. CONCLUSION

Enten Eller, and others like him, have been wronged. It is ironic
that in this time of peace, conscientious objectors are deprived of the
privilege of affirming the religious convictions that others like them
have enjoyed consistently in times of war. As long as draft registration
is required by law, but there is no military conscription, registrants
should be afforded an opportunity to voice their intention to apply for
conscientious objector status should a draft commence. Provision of
such an option would not harm the registration process. At the same
time, it would allow earnest conscientious objectors their right to the
free exercise of their religious beliefs.
116The proposed statutory language should be codified at the end of 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 456(j)
(West Cum. Supp. 1982).
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In the absence of the adoption of the amendment to the MSSA
that has been proposed in the previous section, the resumption of
conscription in a time of national emergency might witness a damaging number of registrants who would refuse to bear arms. By providing the option that has been suggested, the Government would be
given both a useful yardstick by which to measure this likely shortage
of fighting forces and the chance to make any necessary adjustments in
its contingency planning.

